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abSTraCT 
Conceptualising smallholder farming households as collective action institutions, 
that make interrelated decisions about investment, resource use and allocation in a common 
household farm, may contribute to understanding widely observed uncooperative outcomes, 
such as yield gaps, gender gaps in productivity, suboptimal or Pareto inefficient sustainable in-
tensification and climate change adaptation. We examine the relation between participatory 
intra-household decision making – as a set of ‘rules of the game’ that reduces information and 
bargaining power asymmetries – and cooperative, i.e. more efficient, sustainable and equitable, 
outcomes in smallholder coffee farming households in Uganda. We find experimental evidence 
that participatory decision making is positively related to investments in the common household 
farm. Consumption behaviour however is not fairer nor more sustainable. Participatory decision 
making is associated with more cooperative actual outcomes such as greater investment in sus-
tainable intensification, consideration of women’s interests, fairer reproductive intra-household 
labour division, more balanced control over cash crop income and improved livelihoods. 
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1. INTroduCTIoN 
In this article we will explore to what extent intra-household decision making 
about production and resource allocation that better guarantees symmetric information and 
equal involvement in decisions is related to more sustainable, efficient and equitable household 
farming in sub-Saharan Africa. We specifically look at smallholder coffee farming households in 
western Uganda. 
Agricultural production in East Africa, which is characterised by household farming 
systems, does not score high in terms of efficiency or sustainability. There are significant food 
and cash crop yield gaps, including coffee, partly due to biophysical challenges. Management 
issues often aggravate the gaps (Tittonell & Giller, 2013; Wang et al., 2015). Yield gaps are likely 
to widen due to climate change (Blanc, 2012). Yet, adoption rates of sustainable intensification 
measures and climate change adaptation practices are sub-optimal (Boko et al., 2007; Goh, 
2012; Tittonell & Giller, 2013). There is also increasing evidence of significant gender productivity 
gaps, in part linked to imbalanced intra-household allocation of time and resources (i.a. Aguilar, 
Carranza, Goldstein, Kilic, & Oseni, 2014; Ayalew, Bowen, Deininger, & Duponchel, 2015; McGee 
& Backiny-Yetna, 2015); in addition to gender specific responses to climate change which are 
not always optimal from a household perspective (Goh, 2012; Haglund et al., 2014). Such gender 
gaps are likely to contribute to inefficient and unsustainable household farming. At the same 
time, there is overwhelming evidence of intra-household inequalities with regard to resource 
allocation, expenditure, health care and nutrition (Fafchamps, Kebede, & Quisumbing, 2009; 
Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2000). Concurrently, there is experimental evidence, including from 
rural Uganda, that spouses in agricultural households frequently do not maximize the potential 
from cooperation or act opportunistically (i.a. Iversen, Jackson, Kebede, Munro, & Verschoor, 
2011). 
These observations suggest that farming households may not always behave in co-
operative ways. While a multitude of challenges at different institutional levels encumber sus-
tainable, efficient and equitable outcomes of household farming and appropriate adaptation 
to climate change, it is increasingly acknowledged that some of the challenges are situated at 
the intra-household level and that these should be explored more in-depth (Doss & Meinzen-
Dick, 2015; Narayan, 2015). Insights into such intra-household challenges are essential parts of 
the puzzle to achieve agricultural development that is sustainable, gender equal, resilient and 
adaptive to climate change. 
In a household farming system the household is the entity making interrelated 
decisions about (investments in) production and consumption of the resources (re)generated 
through the household farm (i.a. Muller (1994) and Morduch (2005) in the development econom-
ics literature and Fresco and Westphal (1988) in the farming systems literature). There is evi-
dence that each household member has his/her own utility function with different preferences 
and different abilities to impact outcomes (Alderman, Hoddinott et al. 2003; Doss and Meinzen-
Dick 2015). If preferences are different, there will be bargaining between household members 
and the weight of decisions of each household member about production and consumption will 
depend on his/her bargaining power, control over assets, labour and other resources (Agarwal, 
1997; Doss, 2013; Quisumbing, 2003).
While cooperative bargaining models foresee households to come 
to cooperative solutions or else members would have opted out, non-coop-
erative models assert that intra-household decision making is not necessari-
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ly cooperative nor Pareto efficient (Doss & Meinzen-Dick, 2015; Iversen et al., 2011). 
 Doss and Meinzen-Dick (2015) argue that collective action dilemmas arise when members of 
agricultural households - with different control over resources, different preferences, roles and 
constraints - make decisions making about production and consumption. These dilemmas re-
semble the interrelated dilemmas of provision and appropriation from common pool resources 
(CPR). On the one hand, individual CPR users may underinvest in provision because they would 
individually bear the investment costs but only (expect to) receive a share of the benefits (pro-
vision dilemma). On the other hand, individual CPR users may overconsume and deplete the 
resource stock when they can benefit from using the resource while bearing only a portion of the 
costs related to overuse (appropriation dilemma) (Doss & Meinzen-Dick, 2015; Ostrom, 1990). 
Doss and Meinzen-Dick (2015) therefore suggest conceptualising the household as 
a collective action institution, in parallel with the theory on CPR, rather than seeing the house-
hold as a unit or as a set of separate individuals. A key insight of the CPR theory is that coopera-
tive outcomes are possible with appropriate institutions (Ostrom, 1990). Institutions as ‘rules 
of the game’ allow avoiding overexploitation and distributive conflicts and are typically based 
on trust, (reciprocity) norms and mutual commitment (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008; Ostrom, 
1990). Some key features that have been found to be conducive for efficient and sustainable CPR 
governance include communication, symmetric information, homogeneity of the user group, 
symmetric costs and benefits (Baland & Platteau, 1998; Ruttan, 2008). The experience of less 
opportunistic provision and appropriation strengthens incentives for cooperative behaviour; as 
does more involvement in rule and decision making (Agrawal, 2001). Skewed power relations 
have been found to contribute to unequal distribution and unsustainable use of CPR (Lecoutere, 
D’Exelle, & Van Campenhout, 2015). 
Extrapolating the theory and evidence on collective action in CPR settings leads 
us to assume that the ‘rules of the game’ that govern intra-household decision making about 
production and consumption of household commons can be decisive for whether the household 
reaches cooperative outcomes. There is experimental evidence that cooperative outcomes are 
more likely in the absence of asymmetric information between spouses and in the absence of 
spousal heterogeneity, like differences in endowment, education level, occupation, age (Iversen 
et al., 2011). Other experimental studies tested the effect of communication, allocation rules and 
responsibilities, the composition of the group (e.g. polygamous versus monogamous house-
holds) or prevalent gender roles (e.g. North India with limited versus South India with more fe-
male autonomy) (Iversen et al., 2011; Kebede, Tarazona, Munro, & Verschoor, 2014; Mani, 2008; 
Munro, Kebede, Tarazona-Gomez, & Verschoor, 2010; Munro, Kebede, Tarazona-Gomez, & 
Verschoor, 2014). The findings are not always clear-cut as in many cases the effects interact with 
the context and social norms defining gender roles or intra-household decision making (Ashraf, 
2009; Iversen et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, theory and evidence on intra-household bargaining shows that wom-
en’s bargaining power affects the outcomes of household decisions (Doss & Meinzen-Dick, 2015). 
Limited bargaining power of women leads to sub-optimal allocation of labour or men capturing 
benefits from new agronomic techniques (Doss, 2013). Although intra-household bargaining 
seems likely to influence the adoption of new agricultural technologies, this has received little 
attention in the literature (Doss, 2013). Agarwal (1997) argues that inequitable outcomes are less 
likely when women participate more effectively in intra-household decision making.
In this article we investigate if cooperative outcomes are more likely when agricul-
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tural households, as collective action institutions, adopt favourable ‘rules of the game’. Such 
‘rules of the game’ can consists of a manner of intra-household decision making that is likely 
to reduce information asymmetries between household members, ease power imbalances and 
increase the involvement of each member in rule and decision making. In particular we examine 
the relation between cooperative outcomes and participatory intra-household decision making. 
Intra-household decision making is considered to be participatory when household members, 
especially spouses, consult with each other and collaborate on issues related to production, re-
source allocation and consumption in the household farm. In line with CPR theory, more co-
operative outcomes would entail more sustainable, efficient and equitable household farming 
systems (Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom, 1990). 
To investigate this we will address two questions: First, is provision and appropria-
tion behaviour in farming households who have a participatory way of intra-household decision 
making more cooperative in an experimental setting? We will test the following hypotheses by 
means of a framed economic experiment, typically used to study provision and appropriation 
dilemmas in CPR settings: Men and women in couples who adopted participatory decision mak-
ing contribute more to investments in the household commons (Hypothesis 1) and contribute 
more equally (Hypothesis 2). They also consume in a more sustainable (Hypothesis 3) and fair way 
(Hypothesis 4) from the household income they generated through investment in the experiment.
The second question revolves around the relation between participatory intra-
household decision making and the sustainability, efficiency and equitability of the outcomes 
of intra-household provision and appropriation behaviour. We will test the following hypoth-
eses based on an individual survey conducted separately among husbands and wives: Men and 
women in couples who adopted participatory decision making invest more in sustainable in-
tensification (Hypothesis 5). Women’s interests are more taken into account (Hypothesis 6), intra-
household time allocation to productive and reproductive tasks is fairer (Hypothesis 7) and there 
is a more balanced control over farm income in these couples (Hypothesis 8). There is a greater 
increase in income (returns of investment) and less food insecurity over time among couples 
who adopted participatory decision making (Hypothesis 9).
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Figure 1 Pathways of change
The hypotheses are based on the fact that spouses, whom adopted participatory 
decision making, are better informed about the household investment and expenditure needs, 
about each other’s contributions to farm production and about each other’s consumption from 
the household income. Reduced uncertainty is expected to weaken incentives for opportunis-
tic behaviour (The pathways of change are visualised in Figure 1 black line). Incentives for co-
operative behaviour are likely to be further strengthened by greater involvement of all in rule 
and decision making and by the repeated experience of others’ less opportunistic provision and 
consumption behaviour (Figure 1 grey line) (Agrawal, 2001). As a result, we expect a more sus-
tainably managed and more productive household farm with more output to sell and a higher 
household farm income, also in the long run. A virtuous circle of more household income remain-
ing for investment and more sustainable and fair consumption of that income is expected to lead 
to improved household wellbeing, translating into enhanced food security. Through more effec-
tive involvement of women in decision making inequitable levels of investment and consump-
tion are likely to be averted (Agarwal, 1997); with a more balance allocation of household labour 
and more attention for food production as a result. 
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Finally, challenging the prevailing norms and rules governing intra-household 
decision making is expected to be conducive for the acceptance of participatory planning and 
decision making about household farming and income expenditure and could have additional 
beneficial effects on cooperative behaviour and outcomes (Figure 1 dotted line) (Kabeer, 1999). 
However, we will not directly measure such effects. 
2. The haNNS r. NeumaNN STIfTuNg geNder program TargeTed aT   
 Smallholder Coffee produCerS
The study concentrates on smallholder producers of Arabica coffee on the slopes 
of the lower Rwenzori Mountains in Kasese district in western Uganda, whom are connected to 
the Hanns R. Neumann Stiftung (HRNS).1 The Kasese branch of HRNS, set up in 2012, works with 
312 farmer groups, composed of approximately 25 coffee producing households, clustered in 10 
depot centres. The Kasese branch of HRNS organizes training in agronomic practices to improve 
productivity and quality of coffee for all its farmer groups. It runs a gender program since August 
2012. HRNS has gradually rolled out the gender program in Kasese district among its farmer 
groups, not in a random way but rather by geographical clusters.
The objective of the gender program is sustainably enhancing economic profitabil-
ity of household farming and improving livelihoods while ensuring equitable access for men and 
women to opportunities and resources (HRNS 2014). Where the gender program is implement-
ed, HRNS conducts couple seminars during which the gender division of labour, control over 
resources for production and benefits are discussed. Customs and norms about gender roles are 
problematized. By using change agents as role models and awareness raising during community 
events, HRNS aims to challenge the prevailing norms and enhance the acceptance of participa-
tory decision making. 
After participating in a couple seminar, couples can sign up to become change 
agents. HRNS then intensively coaches these change agent couples on participatory planning 
and decision making. The change agent couples receive training, are mentored by the gender 
officer of HRNS and are assisted in jointly drafting a plan and budget for agricultural production 
and for household expenditures during quarterly home visits. We call men and women in these 
couples the Direct Change Agents (DCA).
In Kasese, HRNS allows DCA to recruit Indirect Change Agents (ICA). The ICA may 
have participated during progress meetings with DCA and in couple seminars but did not receive 
the change agent coaching nor the home visits. Other people in farmer groups where the gender 
program is implemented may have been exposed to awareness raising about participatory deci-
sion making or have interacted with change agents.
3. reSearCh meThodS
Data was collected in April 2015. We identified farmer groups in which HRNS had 
run the gender program for more than one year to allow repeated interactions contributing to 
changing behaviour. From these groups, we purposively selected change agent couples and 
randomly selected non-change agent couples. Other non-change agent couples were randomly 
selected from farmer groups where HRNS had not implemented the gender program. All farmer 
groups received the same agronomic trainings on coffee production, (diversified) agricultural 
production, post-harvest handling of coffee and marketing by HRNS. Figure 2 locates the farmer 
groups in our sample with and without the gender program.
[1]  In Kasese district HRNS works with Arabica coffee producers, in other areas in Uganda they work with small-
holder producers of Robusta coffee.
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Figure 2 Map of data collection sites
We conducted a framed field experiment with husbands and wives in change agent 
and non-change agent couples. The first stage of the experiment mimicked dilemmas spouses 
face when they decide how much of their available resources to invest in the common house-
hold farm at the beginning of the agricultural season. In practice, per experiment session, we 
provided wife and husband of each couple a box containing 2000 UGX, i.e. ten coins of 200 UGX, 
representing their available resources. We did not reveal this but informed the participants each 
box contained between 0 and 4000 UGX.2 Wives and husbands, seated next to each other, were 
instructed to individually decide, without communicating, how much of their available resourc-
es to invest in the household farm and how much to use for other purposes. They left the amount 
for investment in the box and put the remainder in their pocket which allowed them to actually 
use it for other purposes after the experiment. 
Before the investment decision, we explained participants that returns to invest-
ment, amounting to 10%, 30% or 50%, would be added per couple’s total investment. Random 
assignment of low or high returns to investment mimicked their unpredictability as, in reality, 
these depend on climatic, agronomic and other conditions. 
The second stage of the economic experiment imitated dilemmas wife and husband 
face when, at the end of the season, they decide how much they will individually use from the 
household income generated through the household farm. That income is the sum of their in-
vestments and the returns to investment. We privately disclosed the household income to wife 
and husband of each couple by means of a decision card. Wife and husband then decided individ-
ually, without communicating, how much to individually consume from the household income 
by writing it on the decision card.3 The participants were informed that amount would remain 
secret, also for their partner, and would be paid out to each individual after the experiment. 
Participants understood that if the aggregate consumption by wife and husband was smaller 
[2]  Asymmetric information about initial individual endowment is necessary for investment decisions to be truly 
private (Iversen et al., 2011).
[3]  Illiterate participants were individually assisted by the research assistant.
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than the total household income, the remainder would be household savings, which, in the ex-
periment like in reality, could be used later, for instance for investments in the next season. If 
the aggregate consumption was larger than the total household income, pay-offs would be pro-
portional. 
We did not disclose the number of rounds but explained that the first and second 
stage of the experiment could be repeated to represent consecutive seasons. In practice, we 
conducted the first and second stage of the experiment only once. After the experiment, partici-
pants privately answered to two individual post experiment questions.
We conducted 27 sessions of experiments each with a maximum of 6 couples. In 
total 155 couples participated. On average participants took 2216 UGX home, maximum 3729 
UGX and minimum 500 UGX (i.e. the sum of the amount not invested in the first stage and the 
amount consumed in the second stage).4 Respectively 89%  DCA and 88% non DCA men, 83% 
DCA and 78% non DCA women thought investment decisions in the experiment resembled real 
household farm investment decisions a lot or to some extent. Respectively 84% DCA and 83% 
non DCA men, 68% DCA and 74% non DCA women found there was a lot or some resemblance 
between decisions about the use of the household farming income in the experiment and in real-
ity. 
We individually interviewed all men and women whom participated in the experi-
ment (N=310). We collected information on individual socio-economic characteristics, income 
and assets, farming systems, individual adoption of agronomic practices, intra-household con-
trol over income and household characteristics.
Ex-post, we decided to exclude ICA from our sample. This small sub-sample did not 
receive the intensive coaching on participatory decision making like the DCA but could not be 
treated as non-change agents either as their inclination towards adopting participatory decision 
making may have been stronger. We also excluded outliers, more particularly couples in which 
the wife is (more than) 35 years younger than the husband and the husband (more than) 15 years 
younger than the wife. The operational sample we retained includes 135 couples, including 36 
change agent couples and 99 non-change agent couples.
We can assume change agent couples are more likely to have adopted participatory 
intra-household decision making, both as a result of the coaching and because of their initial 
interest in it (self-selection). To investigate the relation between participatory intra-household 
decision making and cooperative household farming we will compare (spouses in) change agent 
(DCA) couples with non-change agent (non DCA) couples. 
Note that the aim of this study is not to assess the extent to which change can be 
attributed to the HRNS gender program. HRNS did not assign the intensive guidance about par-
ticipatory decision making to randomly selected change agents. By definition change agents are 
self-selected. Hence it is likely that change agents had a greater interest or willingness to adopt 
participatory intra-household decision making than those who did not subscribe to the change 
agent coaching. 
To make change agent couples and non-change agent couples in our sample more 
‘comparable’, we matched them in our operational sample based on the propensity score. The 
propensity score (PS) expresses the conditional probability of being in the treated group given 
a set of covariates, i.e. couple characteristics in this case (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). We es-
[4]  As a reference, the average monthly household income in mid-west Uganda in 2012/2013 was 370,000 UGX 
(UBOS 2014).
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timated the propensity score on the basis of the age of the husband, the difference in age and 
in education level between wife and husband and the size of the farm in acres as declared by 
the husband, using 1:2 nearest neighbour matching without replacement. Farm size was used 
as a proxy for wealth. We included age difference and education difference because there is a 
positive relation between spousal assortative matching and cooperative outcomes (Iversen et 
al., 2011). Besides, larger differences in education coincide with higher education levels of the 
husband, as women are generally lowly educated. Higher education levels of men in turn are as-
sociated with more gender equitable attitudes (Barker et al., 2011). In the matched operational 
sample we retain 36 change agent couples and 72 non-change agent couples; we dropped 27 
un-matched non-change agent couples.5 
Throughout the analyses, we used inverse probability of treatment weighting 
(IPTW) to balance the observations in such a way that the chance the couples in our sample are 
change agents is independent of the (observable) covariates conditional on the PS (Rosenbaum 
& Rubin, 1983). In IPTW, each couple’s weight is equal to the inverse of the probability of the 
couple having ‘received the treatment’ (i.e. be a change agent couple) conditional on their ob-
served covariates (Austin & Stuart, 2015; Hirano & Imbens, 2001). For analyses of husbands’ or 
wives’ data we assigned their couple’s weight.
4. reSulTS
We first examine investment and consumption behaviour in the experiment of hus-
bands and wives in couples whom adopted participatory decision making (DCA) and whom did 
not (non DCA) to test hypotheses 1 to 4. Then, we analyse the survey data to look for relations 
between participatory decision making and outcomes of investment behaviour and consump-
tion behaviour in reality and test hypotheses 5 to 9. 
4.1. Intra-household investment and consumption behaviour in  
 the experiment
4.1.1. Testing hypothesis 1: Men and women in couples who adopted participatory  
 decision making contribute more to investments in the household commons 
We first compare total contributions to investments in the household commons, 
i.e. the sum of contributions by husband and wife, in DCA and non DCA couples. To do so we use 
an IPTW interval regression analysis with a dummy variable taking the value 1 for DCA couples, 
0 otherwise (Model A Table 1). The significant positive coefficient of the DCA dummy demon-
strates that total contributions by DCA couples are significantly higher than those by non DCA 
couples. 
[5]  In Annex A we present the assessment of balance of the PSM.
We list descriptive statistics of individual and household characteristics of change agents (DCA) and non-change 
agents (non DCA) in our matched operational sample in Annex B. 
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Table 1: Investment behaviour in the experiment
Significance levels6: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15 
Next, we examine investment behaviour by husbands and wives. Figure 3 shows 
that about one third of non DCA husbands invests 1000 UGX (which is half of the initial endow-
ment). Relatively large proportions of DCA husbands invest more than 1000 UGX. There is a 
strong tendency of women to invest half of the available 2000 UGX but particularly DCA wives 
are more likely to invest higher amounts.
Figure 3 IPTW percentages of husbands/wives in DCA and non-DCA couples 
 per amount invested in the experiment
We found a weakly significant difference (0.15) in amounts invested in the house-
hold commons between DCA and non DCA husbands (Model B in Table 1). The contributions to 
investment in the household commons of DCA wives are significantly higher than those by non 
DCA wives (significant positive DCA dummy in Model C Table 1).
The evidence confirms that couples and women in couples who adopted participa-
tory decision making contribute more to investments in the household commons in the experi-
ment.
[6]  As we deal with small sample sizes we will at times mention differences at more liberal significance levels up to 
0.15, while being wary that the chance of erroneously rejecting a true null hypothesis increases (Peers, 2006 p149).
Dependent Vari-
able
Total contribution by couple Contribution to investment by husband Contribution to investment by wife Difference contribution husband 
and wife
IPTW 
average
S.E. IPTW 
average
S.E. IPTW 
average
S.E. IPTW 
average
S.E.
DCA 2433.5 104.9 1182.2 66.4 1251.4 65.0 -69.2 79.1
Non DCA 2114.3 73.9 1062 42.5 1051.7 45.7 11.0 48.2
IPTW interval regression IPTW interval regression IPTW interval regression IPTW general linear model
Model A Model B Model C Model D
B S.E. z Sig. B S.E. z Sig. B S.E. z Sig. B S.E. t Sig.
(Constant) 2114.3 73.9 28.61 .000*** 1062.7 42.5 22.66 .000*** 1051.7 45.7 20.82 .000*** 11.0 48.2 .228 .820
DCA dummy 319.2 128.3 2.49 .013* 119.5 78.8 1.52 .129. 199.7 79.5 2.51 .012* -80.2 92.6 -.866 .389
N (unweighted) 
DCA
36 36 36 36
Non DCA 72 72 72 72
N (weighted)
DCA
136.7 136.7 136.7 136.7
Non DCA 99.5 99.5 99.5 99.5
R² .008
Log-likelihood -595.98 -1731.05 -1735.19
Chi² 6.19 2.30 6.31
Prob > Chi² .013 .129 .012
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Significance levels8: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15  
Next, we examine investment behaviour by husbands and wives. Figure 3 shows that about one third of non 
DCA husbands invests 1000 UGX (which is half of the initial endowment). Relatively large proportions of 
DCA husbands invest more than 1000 UGX. There is a strong tendency of women to invest half of the 
available 2000 UGX but particularly DCA wives are more likely to invest higher amounts. 
  
Figure 3 IPTW percentages of husbands/wives in DCA and non-DCA couples per amount invested in the experiment 
We found a weakly significa t difference (0.15) in amounts invested in the household commons between 
DCA and non DCA husbands (Model B in Table 1). The contributions to investment in the household 
commons of DCA wives are significantly higher than those by non DCA wives (significant positive DCA 
dummy in Model C Table 1). 
The evidence confirms that couples and women in couples who adopted participatory decision making 
contribute more to investments in the household commons in the experiment. 
1.2. Testing hypothesis 2: Men and women in couples who adopted participatory decision making 
contribute more equally to investment in the household commons  
To analyse the relation between participatory decision making and equal investments by spouses,  we first 
look at (weighted) frequencies of DCA and non DCA couples by level of difference in investments (presented 
in Figure 4). A positive difference indicates the husband contributed a higher amount than his wife. A 
relatively high percentage of non DCA couples invest equal amounts, in fact many non DCA husbands and 
wives both invest 1000 UGX (see Figure 3). Model D in Table 1 shows that, on average, spousal investment 
differences are equal to zero both in non DCA and in DCA couples (insignificant coefficient of the intercept 
and the DCA dummy). Hence, the evidence does not support hypothesis 2. 
                                                     
8 As we deal with small sample sizes we will at times mention differences at more liberal significance levels up to 0.15, while being 
wary that the chance of erroneously rejecting a true null hypothesis increases (Peers, 2006 p149). 
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4.1.2. Testing hypothesis 2: Men and women in couples who adopted participatory  
 decision making contribute more equally to investment in the household  
 commons 
To analyse the relation between participatory decision making and equal invest-
ments by spouses,  we first look at (weighted) frequencies of DCA and non DCA couples by level 
of difference in investments (presented in Figure 4). A positive difference indicates the husband 
contributed a higher amount than his wife. A relatively high percentage of non DCA couples 
invest equal amounts, in fact many non DCA husbands and wives both invest 1000 UGX (see 
Figure 3). Model D in Table 1 shows that, on average, spousal investment differences are equal to 
zero both in non DCA and in DCA couples (insignificant coefficient of the intercept and the DCA 
dummy). Hence, the evidence does not support hypothesis 2.
Figure 4 IPTW percentages of DCA and non DCA couples by difference in  
 investment between husband and wife
4.1.3. Testing hypothesis 3 and 4: Men and women in couples who adopted partici 
 patory decision making consume in a more fair and sustainable way from the  
 household income 
First, we look at the fairness of consumption in relation to participatory decision 
making. To do so, we examine the share husbands and wives in DCA and non DCA couples con-
sume from the total household income they generated through investment in the experiment 
(i.e. the sum of contributions by husband and wife in stage one plus returns to investment). 
Figure 5 shows that, while most DCA husbands consume about half of the available household 
income, most non DCA husbands consume more than half. A somewhat different pattern emerg-
es for wives: most DCA wives consume more than half and most non DCA consume about half. 
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wife in stage one plus returns to investment). Figure 5 shows that, while most DCA husbands consume about 
half of the available household income, most non DCA husbands consume more than half. A somewhat 
different pattern emerges for wives: most DCA wives consume more than half and most non DCA consume 
about half.  
  
Figure 5 IPTW percentages of husbands/wives in DCA and non-DCA couples per share consumed of the available income 
In model B (resp. model E) in Table 2 we scrutinize differences in shares of income consumed between DCA 
and non DCA husbands (resp. wives) while controlling for the amount of total household income available, 
assuming this could influence consumption behaviour. We included a dummy variable which takes the value 1 
if the total household income is medium high, more specifically between 2601 and 3299 UGX.9 In model C 
                                                     
9 We categorised total household incomes of the second tertile of the complete weighted sample as a medium level total household 
income. The first tertile has total household income between 600 and 2600 UGX and the third tertile between 3300 and 5400 UGX. 
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Figure 5 IPTW percentages of husbands/wives in DCA and non-DCA couples 
 per share consumed of the available income
In model B (resp. model E) in Table 2 we scrutinize differences in shares of income 
consumed between DCA and non DCA husbands (resp. wives) while controlling for the amount 
of total household income available, assuming this could influence consumption behaviour. We 
included a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the total household income is medium 
high, more specifically between 2601 and 3299 UGX.7 In model C (resp. model F), we control for 
one’s own contribution to investment by including a dummy variable taking the value 1 if it was 
medium high, i.e. between 800 and 1200 UGX. 
The negative significant coefficient of the medium investment dummy in Model F 
shows us that wives, regardless of being change agents or not, tend to take smaller shares when 
their contribution to the household commons was medium high. Whether the total household 
income was medium high or not does not make a difference for shares consumed by wives; not 
for DCA nor non DCA wives (insignificant coefficients in model E). 
If one would allow a very liberal significance level of 0.178, one could argue that 
DCA husbands consume smaller shares than non DCA husbands when the total household in-
come is medium high (negative significant coefficient for the interaction term of the DCA and 
medium household income dummies in model B). There are otherwise no indications of smaller 
shares consumed by DCA husbands (DCA dummy not significant in model B, nor model C); nor 
from a relation with the amount contributed (dummy for medium investment by husband is in-
significant in model C). 
[7]  We categorised total household incomes of the second tertile of the complete weighted sample as a medium 
level total household income. The first tertile has total household income between 600 and 2600 UGX and the third 
tertile between 3300 and 5400 UGX.
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about half.  
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In model B (resp. model E) in Table 2 we scrutinize differences in shares of income consumed between DCA 
and non DCA husbands (resp. wives) while controlling for the amount of total household income available, 
assuming this could influence consumption behaviour. We included a dummy variable which takes the value 1 
if the total household inc me is medium high, more specificall between 2601 and 3299 UGX.9 In model C 
                                                   
9 We categorised total household incomes of the second tertile of the complete weighted sample as a medium level total household 
income. The first tertile has total household income between 600 and 2600 UGX and the third tertile between 3300 and 5400 UGX. 
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Table 2: Shares of income consumed in the experiment
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15 
Next, we look at the sustainability and fairness of consumption by the couple. Our 
indicator for overconsumption is the difference between aggregate consumption of spouses and 
the total household income (including returns to investment). It is positive in case of overcon-
sumption. The IPTW general linear model (GLM) estimates of overconsumption  do not show 
any relation with being change agents or not (insignificant DCA dummy); nor with levels of total 
household income available (insignificant medium total household income dummy) (Model A 
Table 3).
Table 3 Overconsumption and fairness of consumption in the experiment by  
 couples
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15 
We constructed a dummy variable taking the value 1 if both husband and wife con-
sumed a share higher than 30% but lower than 70% to indicate (relatively) fair consumption by 
the couple. The positive coefficient of the medium total household income dummy in model B 
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(resp. model F), we control for one’s own contribution to investment by including a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 if it was medium high, i.e. between 800 and 1200 UGX.  
The negative significant coefficient of the medium investment dummy in Model F shows us that wives, 
regardless of being change agents or not, tend to take smaller shares when their contribution to the household 
commons was medium high. Whether the total household income was medium high or not does not make a 
difference for shares consumed by wives; not for DCA nor non DCA wives (insignificant coefficients in 
model E).  
If one would allow a very liberal significance level of 0.178, one could argue that DCA husbands consume 
smaller shares than non DCA husbands when the total household income is medium high (negative significant 
coefficient for the interaction term of the DCA and medium household income dummies in model B). There 
are otherwise no indications of smaller shares consumed by DCA husbands (DCA dummy not significant in 
model B, nor model C); nor from a relation with the amount contributed (dummy for medium investment by 
husband is insignificant in model C).  
Table 2: Shares of income consumed in the experiment 
Dependent Variable Share consumed by 
husband 
Share consumed by 
husband 
Share consumed by 
husband 
Share consumed by 
wife 
Share consumed by 
wife 
Share consumed by 
wife 
 IPTW 
average 
S.E.           IPTW 
average 
S.E.           
DCA 0.564 0.044           0.627 0.062           
Non DCA 0.558 0.027           0.559 0.030           
 IPTW GLM IPTW GLM IPTW GLM IPTW GLM IPTW GLM IPTW GLM 
 Model 
A 
   Model 
B 
  Model 
C 
  Model 
D 
  Model 
E 
  Model 
F 
  
 B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. 
(Constant) .558 .027 20.589 .000*** .565 .032 17.396 .000*** .567 .045 12.687 .000*** .559 .030 18.479 .000*** .575 .040 14.442 .000*** .615 .046 13.266 .000*** 
DCA dummy .006 .052 .108 .914 .037 .061 .611 .543 .004 .090 .048 .962 .067 .069 .978 .330 .048 .066 .726 .470 -.010 .088 -.111 .912 
Medium total HH 
income     -.024 .059 -.404 .687        
 -.053 .056 -.944 .347     
Medium total HH 
income *DCA     -.138 .101 -1.357 .178        
 .069 .213 .323 .747     
Medium contribution 
husband         -.015 .056 -.271 .787    
         
Medium contribution 
husband *DCA         .001 .105 .008 .993    
         
Medium contribution 
wife                
     -.102 .060 -1.701 .092° 
Medium contribution 
wife *DCA                
     .146 .138 1.063 .290 
N (unweighted) 
DCA 36  
  36    36    36  
  36    36 
   
Non DCA 72    72    72    72    72    72    
N (weighted) 
DCA 136.7  
  136.7    136.7    136.7    136.7    136.7    
Non DCA 99.5    99.5    99.5    99.5    99.5    99.5    
R² .000    .050    .001    .011    .014    .025    
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15  
Next, we look at the sustainability and fairness of consumption by the couple. Our indicator for 
overconsumption is the difference between aggregate consumption of spouses and the total household income 
(including returns to investment). It is positive in case of overconsumption. The IPTW general linear model 
(GLM) estimates of overconsumption  do not show any relation with being change agents or not (insignificant 
DCA d mmy); or with levels of total household income available (insignificant medium total household 
income dummy) (Model A Table 3). 
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Table 3 Overconsumption and fairness of consumption in the experiment by couples 
Dependent Variable Overconsumption Fair consumption 
 IPTW 
average 
S.E.   IPTW 
frequency 
   
DCA -660.54 281.81   22.6%    
Non DCA -319.40 128.01   34.2%    
 IPTW GLM IPTW logistic regression 
 Model A    Model B     
 B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. 
(Constant) -372.0 164.4 -2.263 .026* -1.027 .325 -3.159 .002** 
DCA dummy -438.3 373.3 -1.174 .243 -.600 .616 -.973 .333 
Medium total HH income 172.8 249.3 .693 .490 1.115 .541 2.063 .042* 
Medium total HH income *DCA 451.3 612.3 .737 .463 .193 1.021 .189 .850 
N (unweighted) 
DCA 36  
  36    
Non DCA 72    72    
N (weighted) 
DCA 136.7  
  136.7    
Non DCA 99.5    99.5    
R² .038    .109 (Nagelkerke )   
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15  
We constructed a dummy variable taking the value 1 if both husband and wife consumed a share higher than 
30% but lower than 70% to indicate (relatively) fair consumption by the couple. The positive coefficient of the 
medium total hous h ld income dum y n model B in Table 3 demonstrates that the likelihood of fair 
consumption by couples is higher at medium levels of total household income as compared to low or high 
levels. This is the case for both DCA and non DCA couples.  
Being change agents or not apparently does not relate to sustainability nor to fairness of consumption from the 
income generated through the household commons.  
2. Actual outcomes of intra-household investment and consumption behaviour 
2.1. Testing hypothesis 5: Men and women in couples who adopted participatory decision making 
invest more in sustainable intensification 
We specifically look into adoption rates of sustainable intensification practices for coffee production as 
outcomes of intra-household investment behaviour. We concentrate on couples in which wife and husband 
agree that the most important cash crop in season B is Arabica coffee and in which the wife declared the 
husband manages the plot or they jointly do it, which is the most common situation.10 That leaves us with an 
unweighted sub-sample of 97 couples. 
Table 4 Adoption rates of sustainable intensification by men, personally or jointly managing coffee as the most important cash crop 
 Non DCA DCA 
Improved seedlings 39.4% 52.9% 
Trenches 91.8% 88.9% 
Intercropping 46.7% 59.9% 
Mulch 50.0% 42.3% 
Compost 13.8% 27.5% 
                                                     
10 Season B is the cropping season that coincides with the rainy season from October to December with harvests in January up to 
February. 
We defined a person who manages the plot (crop) as the person who makes the majority of agricultural decisions with regard to the 
plot (crop) (such as what input to use, what should be done and who should do this, when to weed, when to harvest). It does not mean 
doing the work on the plot. 
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in Table 3 demonstrates that the likelihood of fair consumption by couples is higher at medium 
levels of total household income as compared to low or high levels. This is the case for both DCA 
and non DCA couples. 
Being change agents or not apparently does not relate to sustainability nor to fair-
ness of consumption from the income generated through the household commons. 
4.2. Actual outcomes of intra-household investment and consumption be 
 haviour
4.2.1. Testing hypothesis 5: Men and women in couples who adopted participatory  
	 decision	making	invest	more	in	sustainable	intensification
We specifically look into adoption rates of sustainable intensification practices 
for coffee production as outcomes of intra-household investment behaviour. We concentrate 
on couples in which wife and husband agree that the most important cash crop in season B is 
Arabica coffee and in which the wife declared the husband manages the plot or they jointly do 
it, which is the most common situation.8 That leaves us with an unweighted sub-sample of 97 
couples.
Table 4 Adoption rates of sustainable intensification by men, personally or  
 jointly managing coffee as the most important cash crop
Non DCA DCA
Improved seedlings 39.4% 52.9%
Trenches 91.8% 88.9%
Intercropping 46.7% 59.9%
Mulch 50.0% 42.3%
Compost 13.8% 27.5%
Chemical fertiliser 4.7% 13.2%
Herbicides 12.3% 13.3%
Pesticides 6.0% 13.5%
Shade trees 58.8% 76.6%
Pruning 77.4% 78.4%
Stumping 22.2% 37.1%
Weighted N 91.5 119.5
We present weighted percentages of men in DCA and non DCA couples who adopt-
ed a particular sustainable intensification practice in Table 4.9 We further explored adoption 
rates that are markedly different between DCA and non DCA husbands using IPTW logistic re-
[8]  Season B is the cropping season that coincides with the rainy season from October to December with harvests 
in January up to February.
We defined a person who manages the plot (crop) as the person who makes the majority of agricultural decisions with 
regard to the plot (crop) (such as what input to use, what should be done and who should do this, when to weed, when 
to harvest). It does not mean doing the work on the plot.
[9]  For an overview of recommended coffee management practices in Uganda see (Bongers et al., 2015). Most of 
the practices considered here are recognized as sustainable intensification practices, with (some) potential to in-
crease resilience to climate change effects.
Improved seedlings imply coffee seedlings come from certified nurseries. Trenches, including terracing, are applied as a 
soil and water conservation measure. With intercropping we refer to the practice of simultaneously growing crops with 
complementary nutrients. Applying mulch is a moisture and nutrient conservation measure and can serve as weed 
control. Compost is the practice whereby manure or household residue compost is applied to add nutrients to the 
soil. With fertiliser, herbicides, pesticides we refer to application of inorganic products to add nutrients, control weeds 
or pests. Pruning is a coffee specific agronomic practice that consists of removing excess berries to ensure a balanced 
crop/leaf ratio. Stumping rejuvenates old coffee trees.
We consider the practice as adopted if the husband declared he applied it to the entire or relatively large part of the 
coffee plantation.
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gression analysis (Table 5).10 The positive significant coefficients of the DCA dummy in model D, 
G and H indicate that husbands in DCA couples are more likely than those in non DCA couples to 
have adopted respectively composting, the planting of shade trees and stumping as sustainable 
intensification practices (significance level of 0.15). At a very liberal significance level of 0.171, 
one could say DCA husbands are more likely to have applied chemical fertiliser than non DCA 
husbands. 
Table 5 The likelihood of adopting sustainable intensification measures for  
 coffee as the most important cash crop (by men)
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15 
Next, we analyse to what extent participatory decision making relates to the adop-
tion of sustainable intensification practices for food crop production. We focus on households in 
which the wife declared that cassava is the most important food crop for the household and that 
she manages the crop herself or jointly with her husband, which is the most common situation.11 
As such, we retain 81 households in the unweighted sub-sample. 
Table 6 Adoption rates of sustainable intensification among women,  
 personally or jointly managing cassava as the most important food crop
Non DCA DCA
Improved seedlings 0.00% 0.00%
Trenches 24.64% 10.14%
Intercropping 65.39% 82.11%
Mulch 9.44% 8.79%
Compost 0.00% 0.00%
Chemical fertiliser 0.00% 0.00%
Herbicides 0.00% 0.00%
Pesticides 0.00% 0.00%
Weighted N 75.8 96.5
We present adoption rates of different sustainable agronomic practices by wives for 
cassava production in Table 6. In our sample, only trenches, intercropping and the application of 
mulch are applied to cassava. Table 7 shows us that, unexpectedly, women in DCA couples are 
less likely than women in non DCA couples to have adopted trenches for cassava production. But 
[10]  We tested to what extent respondents’ contribution to investment in the experiment relates to investments in 
reality by including it in each of the models in Table 5 but it was never significant.
[11]  Cassava is the most commonly cited most important food source in season B, followed by plantain.
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Chemical fertiliser 4.7% 13.2% 
Herbicides 12.3% 13.3% 
Pesticides 6.0% 13.5% 
Shade trees 58.8% 76.6% 
Pruning 77.4% 78.4% 
Stumping 22.2% 37.1% 
Weighted N 91.5 119.5 
 
We present weighted percentages of men in DCA and non DCA couples who adopted a particular sustainable 
intensification practice in Table 4.11 We further explored adoption rates that are markedly different between 
DCA and non DCA husbands using IPTW logistic regression analysis (Table 5).12 The positive significant 
coefficients of the DCA dummy in model D, G and H indicate that husbands in DCA couples are more likely 
than those in non DCA couples to have adopted respectively composting, the planting of shade trees and 
stumping as sustainable intensification practices (significance level of 0.15). At a very liberal significance 
level of 0.171, one could say DCA husbands are more likely to have applied chemical fertiliser than non DCA 
husbands.  
Table 5 The likelihood f adopting sustainable intensific tion measures for coffee as the most important cash crop (by men) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Improved 
seedlings 
Intercropping Mulch Compost Fertiliser Pesticides Shade trees Stumping 
 IPTW logistic 
regression 
IPTW logistic 
regression 
IPTW logistic 
regression 
IPTW logistic 
regression 
IPTW logistic 
regression 
IPTW logistic 
regression 
IPTW logistic 
regression 
IPTW logistic 
regression 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 
 B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. 
(Constant) 
-.429 .254 -1.688 
.095
° -.130 .249 -.523 .602 -.002 .248 -.007 .994 
-
1.83
4 
.362 -5.063 
.000
*** 
-
3.00
2 
.595 -5.047 
.000
*** 
-
2.75
0 
.519 -5.300 
.000
*** .357 .253 1.414 .161 
-
1.25
4 
.304 -4.128 
.000*
** 
DCA dummy .545 .453 1.203 .232 .530 .453 1.169 .245 -.309 .454 -.680 .498 .864 .562 1.538 .127. 1.116 .809 1.381 .171 .893 .754 1.185 .239 .827 .518 1.596 .114. .727 .488 1.488 .140. 
N (unweighted) 
DCA 31 
   
31  
  
31 
   
31  
  
31    31 
   
31  
  
31    
Non DCA 66    66    66    66    66    66    66    66    
N (weighted) 
DCA 
119.
5 
   119.
5  
  119.
5 
   119.
5  
  119.
5    
119.
5 
   119.
5  
  119.
5    
Non DCA 91.5    91.5    91.5    91.5    91.5    91.5    91.5    91.5    
R² (Nagelkerke) .024    .023    .008    .043    .046    .032    .050    .037    
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15  
Next, we analyse to what extent participatory decision making relates to the adoption of sustainable 
intensification practices for food crop production. We focus on households in which the wife declared that 
cassava is the most important food crop for the household and that she manages the crop herself or jointly 
                                                     
11 For an overview of recommended coffee management practices in Uganda see (Bongers et al., 2015). Most of the practices 
considered here are recognized as sustainable intensification practices, with (some) potential to increase resilience to climate change 
effects. 
Improved seedlings imply coffee seedlings come from certified nurseries. Trenches, including terracing, are applied as a soil and water 
conservation measure. With intercropping we refer to the practice of simultaneously growing crops with complementary nutrients. 
Applying mulch is a moisture and nutrient conservation measure and can serve as weed control. Compost is the practice whereby 
manure or household residue compost is appli d to add nutrients to the soil. With fertiliser, herbicides, pesticides we refer to 
application of inorganic products to add nutrients, control weeds or pests. Pruning is a coffee specific agronomic practice that consists 
of removing excess berries to ensure a balanced crop/leaf ratio. Stumping rejuvenates old coffee trees. 
We consider the practice as adopted if the husband declared he applied it to the entire or relatively large part of the coffee plantation. 
12 We tested to what extent respondents’ contribution to investment in the experiment relates to investments in reality by including it in 
each of the models in Table 5 but it was never significant. 
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they are more likely to have adopted intercropping, which is generally a widespread practice. 
Table 7 The likelihood of adopting sustainable intensification measures for  
 cassava as the most important food crop (by women)
Dependent Variable Trenches Intercropping
IPTW logistic regression IPTW logistic regression
Model A Model B 
B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig.
(Constant) -1.118 .321 -3.486 .001** .636 .286 2.223 .029*
DCA dummy -1.063 .730 -1.456 .149. .888 .587 1.512 .135.
N (unweighted)
DCA
26 26
Non DCA 55 55
N (weighted)
DCA
96.5 96.5
Non DCA 75.8 75.8
R² (Nagelkerke) .062 .053
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15 
Evidence supports our hypothesis of a positive relation between participatory deci-
sion making and sustainable intensification of cash crop production, more particular of coffee 
(by men). The evidence of a relation with sustainable intensification of food crop production (by 
women) is weak and contradictory.
4.2.2. Testing hypothesis 6: Women’s interests are taken more into account when  
 couples have adopted participatory decision making
Assuming food crops are still mainly women’s concern, more investments in inten-
sification of food crop production in change agent couples could have been one indication that 
women’s interest are more taken into account in these couples. Yet, in the previous section, we 
saw this is not really the case. 
Joint or women ownership of the plots on which food or cash crops are grown would 
be another indication that women’s interests are more considered. It is likely that women or 
joint ownership, especially if that view is shared by spouses, has a positive effect on the control 
women have over the plots and the claim women can lay on the benefits derived from the crops.
Yet, an IPTW logistic regression analysis on the sub-sample of couples in which 
spouses agree that the most important cash crop is Arabica coffee (N = 100 unweighted) does 
not indicate a significant relation between being change agents and the likelihood of (husband 
declared) joint ownership of coffee plots (Model A Table 8). 12 Then we looked at the sub-sample 
of couples in which spouses agree on the most important food crop in the household farm (most-
ly cassava, plantain in a few cases)  (N = 95 unweighted). Agreed upon joint or woman owner-
ship of the most important food crop plots is significantly more likely among DCA than non DCA 
couples (Model B Table 8).
[12]  None of the husbands states the plot on which coffee is grown as the first cash crop is owned by their wife.
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Table 8 The likelihood of joint ownership of cash crop plots and women/ 
 joint ownership of food crop plots
Dependent Variable Husband declared joint ownership of 1st 
cash crop plot
Agreed upon joint or wife ownership of 1st 
food crop plot 
IPTW 
frequency
IPTW 
frequency
DCA 37.3% 28.4%
Non DCA 25.0% 15.1%
IPTW logistic regression IPTW logistic regression
Model A Model B 
B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig.
(Constant) -1.099 .283 -3.889 .000*** -1.726 .364 -4.742 .000***
DCA dummy .580 .469 1.235 .220 .798 .527 1.514 .133.
N (unweighted)
DCA
32 33
Non DCA 68 62
N (weighted)
DCA
121.6 127.2
Non DCA 94.1 86.2
R² (Nagelkerke) .024 .037
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15 
4.2.3. Testing hypothesis 7: Time allocation to productive and reproductive tasks is  
 fairer when couples have adopted participatory decision making
We asked respondents for the number of hours spent on various activities the pre-
vious day (of 12 hours). We distinguished activities related to farm production, harvesting, re-
productive tasks (including cleaning, cooking, child care), care for cattle and small livestock, 
fetching water and/or firewood, post-harvest activities, daytime rest, leisure time, marketing 
and off farm income generating activities. Later in the interview, we asked respondents wheth-
er they (strongly) disagreed, (strongly) agreed or were neutral about the statement that ‘farm 
work should be equally divided between spouses’ and the statement that ‘men should help their 
wives with domestic tasks like cooking, cleaning, washing, fetching water and firewood’.
If participatory decision making is associated with fairer intra-household time allo-
cation, we expect that DCA husbands will spend more time on reproductive tasks, which include 
cleaning, cooking and child care, than non DCA husbands. We are also interested in husbands’ 
opinion about helping with domestic tasks (dummy taking the value 1 if the husband (strongly) 
agrees and the relation with the time they spend on reproductive tasks. 
The positive significant coefficient of the DCA dummy in model A in Table 9 shows 
the likelihood of agreeing with sharing domestic work is larger among DCA husbands. Model C 
demonstrates that husbands who agree men should help with domestic work seem to practice 
what they preach as their time spent on domestic work is significantly higher. Being part of a 
change agent couple does not directly increase the time husbands spend on domestic work (in-
significant coefficient of the DCA dummy in model B); not even when they are of the opinion that 
men should help with domestic work (insignificant interaction effect of the DCA and opinion 
dummy in model D).
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Table 9 Intra-household time allocation to reproductive and  
 productive activities
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15 
Secondly, we analyze equality of time spent on farm work, which includes produc-
tion and harvest activities, in relation to participatory decision making and in relation to one’s 
opinion on equally sharing farm work. Our indicator is the difference in time spent on farm work 
by husband and wife. It is negative if the wife spends more time on farm work. Overall, intra-
household time allocation on farm work seems rather equal and most men are of the opinion it 
should be shared equally. Still we checked for relations between the equality of time spent on 
farm work and the adoption of participatory decision making and opinions but found no signifi-
cant relations (Model E to H Table 9).
4.2.4. Testing hypothesis 8: More balanced control over income among couples who  
 adopted participatory decision making
To check this hypothesis we focus on income from coffee as the most important cash 
crop and we limit to households in which spouses agree coffee is the most important cash crop 
(N unweighted = 100). As there is only one case in which spouses agree that the wife controls 
(much) more than half or (almost) all of the income from coffee, we look at whether husband 
and wife agree that they jointly control (much) more than half or (almost) all of that income.13 
We constructed a dummy variable taking the value 1 if spouses agree on the latter. Results from 
a IPTW logistic regression analysis confirm that the likelihood on agreeing upon joint control of 
the lion share of the coffee income is positively related to being change agents, which supports 
our hypothesis (Table 10). 
[13]  We defined control over the income as making the (majority of) decisions on who can spend the money and on 
what the income will be spent.
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taking the value 1 if the husband (strongly) agrees and the relation with the time they spend on reproductive 
tasks.  
The positive significant coefficient of the DCA dummy in model A in Table 9 shows the likelihood of 
agreeing with sharing domestic work is larger among DCA husbands. Model C demonstrates that husbands 
who agree men should help with domestic work seem to practice what they preach as their time spent on 
domestic work is significantly higher. Being part of a change agent couple does not directly increase the time 
husbands spend on domestic work (insignificant coefficient of the DCA dummy in model B); not even when 
they are of the opinion that men should help with domestic work (insignificant interaction effect of the DCA 
and opinion dummy in model D). 
Table 9 Intra-household time allocation to reproductive and productive activities 
Dependent 
Variable 
Husband agrees 
men share 
reproductive tasks 
(HB_repro) 
Husband time spent 
on reproductive 
activiities 
Husband time 
spent on 
reproductive 
activiities 
Husband time spent 
on reproductive 
activiities 
Husband agrees 
equal sharing farm 
work (HB_farm) 
Difference time farm 
work 
Difference time farm 
work 
Difference time farm 
work 
 IPTW 
frequ
ency 
   IPTW 
avera
ge 
S.E.           IPTW 
frequ
ency 
   IPTW 
avera
ge 
S.E.            
DCA 71.1
% 
   1.53 .35           90.7
% 
   -.57 .47           
Non DCA 56.2
% 
   1.36 .21           85.4
% 
   -.21 .36           
 IPTW logistic 
regression 
IPTW GLM IPTW GLM IPTW GLM IPTW logistic 
regression 
IPTW GLM IPTW GLM IPTW GLM 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G Model H 
 B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. B S.E. t Sig. 
(Constant) 
.249 .239 1.040 .301 1.362 .208 6.557 
.000
*** .999 .188 
5.31
9 
.000
*** 
1.14
5 .198 5.778 
.000
*** 
-
1.76
9 
.344 -5.140 
.000
*** -.213 .357 -.595 .553 .461 
1.11
4 .413 .680 .405 
1.09
4 .371 .712 
DCA dummy .652 .447 1.460 .147. .167 .404 .413 .681     -.307 .382 -.803 .424 -.506 .643 -.788 .433 -.354 .591 -.599 .550     .118 2.303 .051 .959 
HB_repro        .748 .369 2.025 
.046
* .401 .395 1.015 .312 
                
DCA* HB_repro            .643 .700 .918 .361                 
HB_farm                        -.993 1.158 -.857 .393 -.723 
1.15
6 -.626 .533 
DCA * HB_farm                            -.479 2.380 -.201 .841 
N (unweighted) 
DCA 36 
   31    31    31    36    36    36    36    
Non DCA 72   69    69    69    72    72    72    72    
N (weighted) 
DCA 
136.
9 
   116.
9 
   116.
9  
  116.
9 
   136.
9  
  136.
9    
136.
9 
   136.
9 
   
Non DCA 99.5   95.3    95.3    95.3    99.5    99.5    99.5    99.5    
R²  .032  (Nage
lkerke
) 
  .002    .04    .048    .013( (Nage
lkerke
) 
  
.004    
.012    .015    
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15  
Secondly, we analyze equality of time spent on farm work, which includes production and harvest activities, 
in relation to participatory decision making a d in relation t  one’s opi ion o  equally sharing farm work. Our 
indicator is the difference in time spent on farm work by husband and wife. It is negative if the wife spends 
more time on farm work. Overall, intra-household time allocation on farm work seems rather equal and most 
men are of the opinion it should be shared equally. Still we checked for relations between the equality of time 
spent on farm work and the adoption of part cipatory dec sion making and opinions but found no significant 
relations (Model E to H Table 9). 
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Table 10 The likelihood of agreeing on joint control over the lion’s share of  
 income from coffee as the most important cash crop
Dependent Variable Agreement on joint control of large share of coffee 
income
IPTW frequency
DCA 84.5%
Non DCA 68.9%
IPTW logistic regression
B S.E. t Sig.
(Constant) .797 .265 3.008 .003**
DCA dummy .901 .565 1.596 .114.
N (unweighted)
DCA
32
Non DCA 68
N (weighted)
DCA
121.6
Non DCA 94.1
R² (Nagelkerke) .052
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15 
4.2.5. Testing hypothesis 9: Greater increase in income (returns of investment) and  
 less food insecurity over time among couples who adopted participatory  
 decision making
Before we analyse the change over time in household economic wellbeing and 
food security in relation to participatory decision making, we look at the current (self-declared) 
household food insecurity and economic wellbeing. We measured subjective relative household 
economic wellbeing with an indicator based on respondents’ opinion whether their household 
is (much) better off, the same or (much) worse off, in terms of income and consumption, than 
the average household in their community (Table 11). There are no remarkable discrepancies be-
tween DCA and non DCA women, nor men, except that more non DCA men than DCA men be-
lieve they are worse off in comparison to other households in their community. 
The indicator for household food insecurity is based on respondents’ indication 
that, in the 3 months prior to the interview, their household members ate fewer or smaller meals 
or were not able to eat the commonly preferred foods because there was not enough food or 
resources. The high proportions of people indicating their household is food insecure are due to 
the timing of the survey when food security is a recurrent seasonal challenge and to the high in-
cidence of banana Xanthomonas wilt disease in plantain plantations in this area which reduced 
food availability (Table 11).
Table 11 IPTW percentages per level of subjective household wellbeing
Women DCA Women non 
DCA
Men DCA Men non 
DCA
Subjective relative well-
being
(Much) worse 25.7% 19.1% 11.0% 24.1%
Same 43.8% 50.5% 45.1% 37.5%
(Much) better 30.5% 30.5% 43.8% 38.4%
Food insecure 59.7% 63.4% 53.0% 50.2%
Participatory intra-household decision making is expected to contribute to improv-
ing household wellbeing and food security through the combined effect of greater investment in 
the common household farm, fairer and more sustainable consumption from the household in-
come, reinforced through repeated interactions. In Figure 7 we plotted the percentages of DCA 
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and non DCA women and men who believe the economic wellbeing of their household, respec-
tively the food security situation, has worsened (much), remained stable or increased (much) as 
compared to four years ago.14 Most respondents believe their household’s economic wellbeing 
has improved over time. Men are somewhat more optimistic than women; and DCA men (resp. 
DCA women) somewhat more than non DCA men (resp. non DCA women). But the likelihood 
of an improvement in economic wellbeing, as reported by women, is the same for DCA and non 
DCA households (insignificant coefficient for the DCA dummy in Model A in Table 12). The same 
applies for improvement in wellbeing, as reported by men (Model B). Yet, in support of our hy-
pothesis, the second most mentioned reason by DCA men and DCA women for improved eco-
nomic wellbeing is the fact that they now jointly plan and manage the household farm.
Figure 6 Change over time in subjective household wellbeing and  
 food security
Most respondents indicate that their household’s food security situation has wors-
ened over time. But more DCA men report an improvement the food security situation as com-
pared to non DCA men; the same applies for women (Figure 6). The positive significant coeffi-
cient of the DCA dummy in model C shows that the likelihood of an improvement in household 
food security, as reported by women, is greater among DCA than among non DCA households 
(Table 12). This is not the case for the likelihood of improved food security, as reported by men 
(insignificant coefficient for the DCA dummy in model D)..
[14]  We used the previous presidential elections as a reference date which is a commonly remembered event that 
took place four years prior to the survey.
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challenge and to the high incidence of banana Xanthomonas wilt disease in plantain plantations in this area 
which reduced food availability (Table 11). 
Table 11 IPTW percentages per level of subjective household wellbeing 
 Women DCA Women non 
DCA 
Men DCA Men non 
DCA 
Subjective relative wellbeing     
(Much) worse 25.7% 19.1% 11.0% 24.1% 
Same 43.8% 50.5% 45.1% 37.5% 
(Much) better 30.5% 30.5% 43.8% 38.4% 
     
Food insecure 59.7% 63.4% 53.0% 50.2% 
Participatory intra-household decision making is expected to contribute to improving household wellbeing and 
food security through the combined effect of greater investment in the common household farm, fairer and 
more sustainable consumption from the household income, reinforced through repeated interactions. In Figure 
6 we plotted the percentages of DCA and non DCA women and men who beli ve the economic w llbeing of 
their household, respectively the food security situation, has worsened (much), remained stable or increased 
(much) as compared to four years ago.16 Most respondents believe their household’s economic wellbeing has 
improved over time. Men are somew at m re opti istic than women; and DCA men (resp. DCA women) 
somewhat more than non DCA en (resp. non DCA women). But the likelihood of an improvement in 
economic wellbeing, as reported by women, is the same for DCA and non DCA households (insignificant 
coefficient for the DCA dummy in Model A in Table 12). The same applies for improvement in wellbeing, as 
reported by m n (Model B). Yet, in support of ur hypothesis, the second most mentioned reason by DCA 
men and DCA women for improved economic wellbeing is the fact that they now jointly plan and manage the 
household farm. 
 
Figure 6 Change over time in subjective household wellbeing and food security 
                                                     
16 We used the previous presidential elections as a reference date which is a commonly remembered event that took place four years 
prior to the survey. 
00%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
non DCA
- Women
DCA -
Women
non DCA
- Men
DCA -
Men
non DCA
- Women
DCA -
Women
non DCA
- Men
DCA -
Men
Change over time in HH  economic
wellbeing
Change over time in HH food security
Change over time in household economic wellbeing and 
food security 
(Much) worse Same (Much) better
25 • IOB working Paper 2016-02 “we’re in This TogeTher”: changing inTra-household decision Making 
 for More cooperaTive sMallholder farMing
Table 12 The likelihood of improvement of household wellbeing and food  
 security over time as reported by women and men
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15 
Based women’s opinion, we can say evidence support the hypothesis of a positive 
relation between food security and participatory decision making. In addition, change agents 
link their improved wellbeing to participatory decision making. 
5. dISCuSSIoN aNd CoNCluSIoN
Part of the reasons why smallholder household farming systems are not always ef-
ficiently, sustainably and equitably managed can be found in the way intra-household decisions 
are made. In this article we examine the relation between a way of intra-household decision 
making that reduces information asymmetries and power imbalances between spouses and co-
operative outcomes. We study smallholder coffee farming households in western Uganda. 
We compare investment and consumption behaviour in an experimental setting of 
men and women in change agent couples, who adopted participatory household planning and 
decision making as encouraged through a gender program by the Hanns R. Neumann Stiftung 
(HRNS), with men and women in couples who did not adopt participatory decision making. We 
also relate participatory intra-household decision making with real outcomes of investment and 
consumption behaviour measured with individual survey data. We specifically look at adoption 
of sustainable intensification practices, intra-household reproductive and productive time al-
location, equality of control over household farming income, economic wellbeing and food se-
curity. 
Our first hypothesis that couples who adopted participatory decision making con-
tribute more to investments in the household commons in the experiment than others is con-
firmed. Especially wives in change agent couples contribute significantly more than non-change 
agent wives. We did not find experimental evidence, however, for our second hypothesis that par-
ticipatory decision making is associated with spouses contributing more equal amounts to the 
household commons.
There is a weak indication that husbands in change agent couples consume smaller 
shares, amounting to  somewhat less than half, of the household income generated through in-
vestment in the commons in the experiment than husbands in non-change agent couples when 
the total household income generated is medium high. Otherwise there is no support for the 
third hypothesis that participatory decision making is related to fairer and more sustainable use 
of the household income. For women, fair consumption is more likely when their contribution 
was medium high but does not relate to being change agents. Couples are more likely to con-
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Most respondents indicate that their household’s food security situation has worsened over time. But more 
DCA men report an improvement the food security situation as compared to non DCA men; the same applies 
for women (Figure 6). The positive significant coefficient of the DCA dummy in model C shows that the 
likelihood of an improvement in household food security, as reported by women, is greater among DCA than 
among non DCA households (Table 12). This is not the case for the likelihood of improved food security, as 
reported by men (insignificant coefficient for the DCA dummy in model D).. 
Table 12 The likelihood of improvement of household wellbeing and food security over time as reported by women and men 
Dependent 
Variable 
Improved wellbeing (woman 
reported) 
Improved wellbeing (man reported) Improved foodsecurity (woman 
reported) 
Improved foodsecurity (man 
reported) 
 IPTW 
frequency 
   IPTW 
frequency 
   IPTW 
frequency 
   IPTW 
frequency 
   
DCA 71.0%    80.2%    34.0%    44.8%    
Non DCA 61.9%    72.4%    20.0%    31.7%    
 IPTW logistic regression IPTW logistic regression IPTW logistic regression IPTW logistic regression 
 Model A    Model B    Model C    Model D    
 B S.E. z Sig. B S.E. z Sig. B S.E. z Sig. B S.E. t Sig. 
(Constant) .484 .246 1.971 .051° .965 .265 3.634 .000*** -1.388 .292 -4.748 .000*** -.769 .255 -3.019 .003** 
DCA dummy .409 .457 .896 .372 .432 .496 .871 .386 .723 .465 1.555 .123. .560 .430 1.302 .196 
N (unweighted)  
DCA 36  
  36  
  36    36 
   
Non DCA 72    72    72    72    
N (weighted) 
DCA 136.7  
  136.7    136.7    136.7    
Non DCA 99.5    99.5    99.5    99.5    
R² (Nagelkerke) .013    .012    .034    .024    
Significance levels: ***=0.001; **=0.01; *=0.05; °=0.1; .=0.15  
Based women’s opinion, we can say evidence support the hypothesis of a positive relation between food 
security and participat ry decision making. In addition, change agents link their improved wellbeing to 
participatory decision making.  
Discussion and conclusion 
Part of the reasons why smallholder household farming systems are not always efficiently, sustainably and 
equitably managed can be found in the way intra-household decisions are made. In this article we examine the 
relation between a way of intra-household decisi n making that reduces informa io  asymmetries and power 
imbalances between spouses a d cooperative outco es. We study smallholder coff e f rming households in 
western Uganda.  
We compare investment and consumption behaviour in an experimental setting of men and women in change 
agent couples, who adopted participatory household planning and decision making as encouraged through a 
gender program by the Hanns R. Neumann Stiftung (HRNS), with men and women in couples who did not 
adopt participatory decision making. We also rel te participatory intra-household decision making with real 
outcomes of investment and consumption behaviour measured with individual survey data. We specifically 
look at adoption of sustainable intensification practices, intra-household reproductive and productive time 
allocation, equality of control over household farming income, economic wellbeing and food security.  
Our first hypothesis that couples who adopted participatory decision making contribute more to investments in 
the household commons in the experiment than others is confirmed. Especially wives in change agent couples 
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sume in a fair way if the household income is medium high. 
Looking at outcomes of intra-household investment behaviour in reality, our re-
sults confirm our fifth hypothesis of a higher likelihood of adopting sustainable intensification 
measures (by men) for the most important cash crop, i.e. coffee, in households whom adopted 
participatory decision making. Especially the adoption of coffee specific sustainable intensifica-
tion practices and of nutrient enhancing practices is higher among change agents than among 
non-change agents. The picture looks different when it comes to intensification of food crop, 
in particular cassava, which is mostly managed by women or jointly with their husband. Few 
sustainable intensification practices are applied for cassava production and only the adoption 
of intercropping is positively related to participatory decision making, which is a widespread 
practice anyhow. 
The evidence to support our sixth hypothesis that women’s interests are more taken 
into account when couples have adopted participatory decision making is not tremendously 
strong. As indicated above, there is little evidence of more investments in (intensification of) 
food crop production. There are weak (but insignificant) indications of a higher likelihood of joint 
ownership of plots on which coffee is grown among change agent couples. But, women are sig-
nificantly more likely to personally or jointly own plots on which food crops are grown in change 
agent couples than in non-change agent couples, possibly enhancing their control over and ben-
efits from these crops. 
We cannot say that participatory decision making makes a difference for the intra-
household fairness of time allocated to productive activities as stated in hypothesis seven. Overall, 
there is fairly equal time spent on farm work in all households and most are of the opinion that 
farm work should be equally divided among spouses, regardless of having adopted participatory 
decision making or not. In support of hypothesis seven, indirectly, there is a relation between 
participatory decision making and men allocating more time to reproductive tasks. More change 
agent husbands agree men should help with reproductive tasks and that opinion is positively 
correlated with the time husbands spend on reproductive tasks.
If we can assume that agreed upon joint control over the largest share of the cash 
crop income, coffee in this case, from also effectively means that control over the use of that 
income is balanced between spouses, then our results support hypothesis eight: There is more 
balanced control over income in couples who adopted participatory decision making.
The likelihood that women report improved food security is significantly higher in 
households who adopted participatory decision making than in other households. Assuming 
that wives are better informed than husbands about the household’s food security situation, 
this supports (part of) hypothesis nine. There are indications, albeit not significant, that the likeli-
hood of advancing economic wellbeing is higher among change agent then among non-change 
agent couples. But change agents see their participatory way of decision making as an impor-
tant reason for improving wellbeing. Taken as a whole, participatory decision making seems 
to contribute to farming systems that are better able to sustainably satisfy the cash and food 
needs of the households and, as such, to improve wellbeing and food security. The fact that 
more change agent households than other households manage to become more food secure -  in 
a setting with serious food security challenges - may also indirectly indicate that women in these 
households had a stronger say in decisions about the household farm and income and ensured 
sufficient food that way.
Different elements in our analysis point to a higher likelihood of cooperative out-
27 • IOB working Paper 2016-02 “we’re in This TogeTher”: changing inTra-household decision Making 
 for More cooperaTive sMallholder farMing
comes when agricultural households, as collective action institutions, adopt favourable ‘rules 
of the game’, in this case participatory intra-household decision making about production and 
resource allocation. Participatory intra-household decision making about household farm pro-
duction and consumption possibly contributes to reducing information asymmetries and (bar-
gaining) power imbalances between spouses and, as such, inspires more cooperative outcomes, 
i.e. more sustainable, efficient and equitable household farming systems.
We identify three main ways forward to further explore the relationship between 
intra-household decision making and efficient, sustainable and equitable household farming. 
First, a random introduction of a program encouraging participatory decision making would al-
low attributing more confidently changes in household farm investment and consumption be-
haviour to changes in intra-household decision  making. Secondly, it could be enlightening to 
study approaches that aim to change intra-household decision making by enhancing women’s 
bargaining power through building women’s human capital, income or asset base. Thirdly, a 
more cooperative outcome may also consist of a whole different household farming system, a 
changed combination of food crops, cash crops and livestock. An analysis from a farming system 
perspective would allow exploring this.  
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aNNex a: aSSeSSmeNT of The balaNCe of propeNSITy SCore maTChINg
Table 13 Sample sizes in propensity score matched and original samples
Sample Sizes
 Control Treated
All 99 36
Matched 72 36
Unmatched 27 0
Discarded 0 0
Table 14 Assessment of balance before and after matching
Detailed balance before matching Detailed balance after matching
 
Means 
Treated
Means 
Control
SD 
Control
Std. Mean 
Diff.
Means 
Treated
Means 
Control
SD 
Control
Std. Mean 
Diff.
propensity .284 .260 .057 .289 .284 .271 .062 .159
ID_11_HB 44.667 42.343 12.867 .187 44.667 42.931 13.578 .140
DIFF_age -7.611 -6.798 6.015 -.121 -7.611 -7.014 5.961 -.089
DIFF_edu -1.083 -.828 1.143 -.168 -1.083 -.986 1.181 -.064
HH_163_HB 3.694 3.141 1.974 .199 3.694 3.389 2.166 .110
propensityxpropensity .087 .071 .032 .308 .087 .077 .035 .192
propensityxID_11_HB 13.338 11.392 5.341 .269 13.338 12.079 5.818 .174
propensityxDIFF_age -2.345 -1.915 1.902 -.178 -2.345 -2.081 2.017 -.109
propensityxDIFF_edu -.386 -.253 .346 -.256 -.386 -.308 .367 -.151
propensityxHH_163_HB 1.222 .899 .777 .233 1.222 1.016 .865 .148
ID_11_HBxID_11_HB 2144.500 1956.848 1212.115 .155 2144.500 2024.847 1285.692 .099
ID_11_HBxDIFF_age -379.722 -319.778 342.913 -.137 -379.722 -340.458 352.705 -.090
ID_11_HBxDIFF_edu -52.917 -35.434 47.831 -.240 -52.917 -42.417 48.899 -.144
ID_11_HBxHH_163_HB 180.778 145.242 122.796 .192 180.778 160.389 135.845 .110
DIFF_agexDIFF_age 101.778 82.030 119.789 .128 101.778 84.236 118.444 .114
DIFF_agexDIFF_edu 6.972 4.465 10.111 .175 6.972 6.208 10.441 .053
DIFF_agexHH_163_HB -29.972 -23.242 29.455 -.155 -29.972 -26.875 32.788 -.071
DIFF_eduxDIFF_edu 3.417 1.980 3.149 .304 3.417 2.347 3.561 .226
DIFF_eduxHH_163_HB -4.556 -2.747 4.207 -.266 -4.556 -3.389 4.518 -.171
HH_163_HBxHH_163_HB 21.139 13.727 21.067 .197 21.139 16.111 23.906 .133
(ID_11_HB= age husband; DIFF_age= (age wife – age husband); DIFF_edu= (education level wife – education level husband); HH_163_
HB= acreage farm reported by husband)
Table 15 Tests of imbalance
Tests of imbalance Before matching
After match-
ing
Relative multivariate imbalance 
measure L1 .843 .833
Unbalanced covariates (|d| > .25) No covariate exhibits a large imbalance (|d| > .25).
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Figure 7 Distribution of propensity scores and line plot of standardized  
 differences before and after matching*
Figure 8 Standardized mean differences (Cohen’s d) before and  
 after matching*
(* Thoemmes, F. (2011). An SPSS R Menu for Propensity Score Matching.)
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Annex A: Assessment of the balance of Propensity Score Matching 
Table 13 Sample sizes in propensity score matched and original samples 
Sample Sizes 
  Control Treated 
All 99 36 
Matched 72 36 
Unmatched 27 0 
Discarded 0 0 
Table 14 Assessment of balance before and after matching 
 Detailed balance before matching Detailed balance after matching 
  
Means 
Treated 
Means 
Control 
SD 
Control 
Std. Mean 
Diff. 
Means 
Treated 
Means 
Control 
SD 
Control 
Std. Mean 
Diff. 
propensity .284 .260 .057 .289 .284 .271 .062 .159 
ID_11_HB 44.667 42.343 12.867 .187 44.667 42.931 13.578 .140 
DIFF_age -7.611 -6.798 6.015 -.121 -7.611 -7.014 5.961 -.089 
DIFF_edu -1.083 -.828 1.143 -.168 -1.083 -.986 1.181 -.064 
HH_163_HB 3.694 3.141 1.974 .199 3.694 3.389 2.166 .110 
propensityxpropensity .087 .071 .032 .308 .087 .077 .035 .192 
propensityxID_11_HB 13.338 11.392 5.341 .269 13.338 12.079 5.818 .174 
propensityxDIFF_age -2.345 -1.915 1.902 -.178 -2.345 -2.081 2.017 -.109 
propensityxDIFF_edu -.386 -.253 .346 -.256 -.386 -.308 .367 -.151 
propensityxHH_163_HB 1.222 .899 .777 .233 1.222 1.016 .865 .148 
ID_11_HBxID_11_HB 2144.500 1956.848 1212.115 .155 2144.500 2024.847 1285.692 .099 
ID_11_HBxDIFF_age -379.722 -319.778 342.913 -.137 -379.722 -340.458 352.705 -.090 
ID_11_HBxDIFF_edu -52.917 -35.434 47.831 -.240 -52.917 -42.417 48.899 -.144 
ID_11_HBxHH_163_HB 180.778 145.242 122.796 .192 180.778 160.389 135.845 .110 
DIFF_agexDIFF_age 101.778 82.030 119.789 .128 101.778 84.236 118.444 .114 
DIFF_agexDIFF_edu 6.972 4.465 10.111 .175 6.972 6.208 10.441 .053 
DIFF_agexHH_163_HB -29.972 -23.242 29.455 -.155 -29.972 -26.875 32.788 -.071 
DIFF_eduxDIFF_edu 3.417 1.980 3.149 .304 3.417 2.347 3.561 .226 
DIFF_eduxHH_163_HB -4.556 -2.747 4.207 -.266 -4.556 -3.389 4.518 -.171 
HH_163_HBxHH_163_HB 21.139 13.727 21.067 .197 21.139 16.111 23.906 .133 
(ID_11_HB= age husband; DIFF_age= (age wife – age husband); DIFF_edu= (education level wife – education level husband); HH_163_HB= acreage farm 
reported by husband) 
Table 15 Tests of imbalance 
Tests of imbalance Before matching 
After 
matching 
Relative multivariate imbalance 
measure L1 .843 .833 
Unbalanced covariates (|d| > .25) No covariate exhibits a large imbalance (|d| > .25). 
  
  
Figure 7 Distribution of propensity scores and line plot of standardized differences before and after matching* 
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aNNex b: deSCrIpTIve STaTISTICS of The maTChed operaTIoNal Sample
Table 16 Descriptive statistics of the matched operational sample
DCA Non DCA
IPTW aver-
age S.E.
IPTW aver-
age S.E.
Age wife 35.7 1.8 36.3 1.4
Age husband 42.7 2.0 43.6 1.6
Acreage farm (husband reported) 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1
Household size (wife reported) 8.0 0.6 7.9 0.3
Value off-farm income wife 52861.9 19925.7 74680.6 19742.3
Value off-farm income husband 281041.0 63524.9 183760.7 34983.2
Table 17 Descriptive statistics of the matched operational sample
DCA women DCA men Non DCA women
Non DCA 
men
Level of education
No formal education 24.0% 9.3% 39.1% 9.4%
Primary up to primary 4 (P4) 
(incl. adult learning) 33.6% 22.7% 27.5% 15.3%
Primary up to primary 7 (P7) 20.3% 27.6% 26.9% 45.5%
Secondary up to senior 4 (O 
level) 22.0% 29.9% 5.0% 23.6%
Tertiary 10.6% 1.6% 6.2%
Most important food crop 
(Season B)
Cassava 82.3% 89.2% 88.8% 88.5%
Banana 15.9% 10.8% 8.5% 10.3%
Maize 1.8% 1.4%
Irish potato  1.2%
N/A 1.2%  
Most important cash crop 
(Season B)
Coffee Arabica 91.6% 94.1% 97.4% 97.2%
Cassava 3.2% 3.2% 1.3%
Beans 2.1% 1.3%
Banana 2.7% 1.4%
Maize 1.4%
N/A 3.1%
 
